Between Promise and Performance: Science and Technology Policy
  Implementation through Network Governance by Whetsell, Travis A. et al.
1 
 
Between Promise and Performance: Science and Technology Policy 
Implementation through Network Governance 
 
Science and Public Policy, forthcoming 
 
Travis A. Whetsell 
Assistant Professor, Department of Public Policy & Administration 
Florida International University 
Travis.whetsell@fiu.edu 
 
Michael J. Leiblein 
Associate Professor, Fisher College of Business 
Ohio State University 
Leiblein.1@osu.edu 
 
Caroline S. Wagner 
Associate Professor, John Glenn College of Public Affairs 
Ohio State University 
Wagner.911@osu.edu 
 
Abstract: This research analyzes the effects of U.S. science and technology policy on the technological 
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success, how the program succeeded remains unclear. This study re-contextualizes Sematech as a network 
administrative organization which lowered cooperation costs and enhanced resource combination for 
innovation at the cutting edge. This study combines network analysis and longitudinal regression 
techniques to test the effects of public policy on organizational network position and technological 
performance in an unbalanced panel of semiconductor firms between 1986 and 2001. This research 
suggests governments might achieve policy through inter-organizational innovations aimed at the 
development and administration of robust governance networks.   
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1. Introduction 
Government programs for science and technology (S&T) operate under conditions of uncertainty 
and complexity different from other kinds of governance frameworks (Hall and Lerner, 2010). 
Many studies on S&T policy rely on theory developed from research programs in economics 
(Malerba, 2002; Nelson and Winter, 1982), business and organizational studies (Teece, Pisano, 
and Shuen, 1997), and patenting activities (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Work in this area often 
lacks an emphasis from public policy and administration. Bringing this perspective to the fore, 
this article synthesizes disparate literatures, combining elements from network governance (e.g. 
Provan and Kenis, 2008; Klijn and Koopenjan, 2015) with elements from organization theory 
and strategic management (e.g. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Stuart 2000). Insights from 
these literatures are leveraged to analyze an exemplar case of government intervention in the 
high-technology sector.  
This study analyzes the implementation of U.S. technology policy during the early 
evolution of a cooperative research and development (R&D) network in the semiconductor 
industry between 1986 and 2001. The focus is on a U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 
sponsored consortium, called Sematech, its hypothesized effects on an emerging R&D alliance 
network, and hypothesized effects on technological performance. The Sematech consortium was 
formed to provide support for the U.S. based semiconductor industry during the mid-1980s 
(Macher, Mowery, and Hodges 1998; Browning and Shetler 2000). Many scholars suggest the 
policy experiment was a success, as the downward trend for U.S. semiconductor market share 
was reversed and the industry remains among the top five U.S. exports with sales valued at 
roughly $165 billion, capturing 50% of the global market in 2015 (SIA Databook, 2016).  
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However, the case presents an interesting theoretical puzzle. A view from public 
administration might suggest that public support for the consortium lowered R&D costs for 
private firms, overlooking the relevance of synergies created through an evolving network of 
relationships. Conversely, a business view might suggest that strategic alliances enhance access 
to resources for competitive advantage, downplaying government support, protection from 
foreign participants, and ignoring a major political crisis with national security overtones. Putting 
the puzzle together requires a pluralistic integration of disparate disciplines and theories 
(Whetsell 2013). The research question of this article is, how might a network administrative 
organization (NAO), such as Sematech, achieve effectiveness given a range of potential 
theoretical explanations? An overlooked element is the intermediate network mechanism 
residing between S&T policy and performance, where we conceptualize the network position of 
an organization as the intermediate mechanism. An empirical analysis of this mechanism, as well 
as its linkages to policy and performance, provides insights into the specific case but also has 
more general implications for government investment in science and technology.  
The theoretical argument of this article is that cooperative governance structures may be 
useful for addressing market failures on volatile technological landscapes. The more specific 
theoretical logic suggest that the Sematech consortium represents a mode of network governance 
(e.g. Klijn and Koopenjan 2015), structured as a network administrative organization (e.g. 
Provan and Kenis 2008), which decreased the costs of cooperation (e.g. Oxley, 1997), improved 
access to complementary resources for innovation (e.g. Barney 1991; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996), and enhanced the social capital and cooperative capacities of participating 
organizations for competitive advantage (e.g. Ahuja 2000; Stuart 2000; Zaheer and Bell 2005). 
The empirical approach of this study is to test hypothesized effects of Sematech membership on 
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the network position of member firms, as well as test hypothesized effects of enhanced network 
position on firm level technological innovation. The basic model is that the performance effects 
of Sematech flow through network position. In addition, this research also tests for spillover 
effects on strategic allies and potential effects of DOD exit from the consortium.  
The following section briefly describes the historical context of the case necessary to 
establish a timeline of events. Section three synthesizes a set of theories from the public and 
private sectors to suggest hypotheses. Section four presents the data collection and analysis 
methods. Section five shows the results of the analysis. Section six discusses the implications of 
the results. Finally, we close with some concluding remarks about the subject and the study.  
 
2. Historical Context & Case Details 
Government investment in science and technology (S&T) has been a central national 
priority for public policy makers and administrators in the United States since at least World War 
II (Bush, 1945). In economic terms, S&T are curious sorts of goods. In contrast to basic goods 
and services, the uncertain and risky nature of S&T activities, as well as the difficulty of 
appropriating returns on research and development (R&D), means they tend to suffer from 
underinvestment in private markets, despite the more general contribution to economic growth 
(Arrow, 1962; Partha and David, 1994; Stephan, 1996). Science is often defined as a public 
good, where other actors cannot be excluded from appropriating its value, and many actors can 
make productive use of scientific knowledge simultaneously (Samuelson, 1954; Stiglitz, 1999). 
These insights suggest that pure markets do not provide the necessary resources for the conduct 
of basic science (Nelson, 1959). In contrast to science, technology has characteristics that make 
it excludable in many cases (Rosenberg, 1982). Technological processes and products may be 
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patented and sold as private goods. Thus, private returns of technology investment may be 
appropriated by the investor. Nevertheless, pure markets for technology also tend to suffer poor 
incentives, high uncertainty, and weaker appropriability of value than basic consumer goods 
(Arrow, 1962; Stephan, 1996). The economic logic of S&T market failure has been a part of the 
rationale for government action since early 20th century. After World War II a mission-based 
logic emerged emphasizing the role of S&T in national defense and other policy or agency 
specific objectives. Toward the end of the 20th century a cooperative boundary spanning logic 
emerged which supported industrial policy and regional economic development (Bozeman 2000; 
Salter and Martin, 2001).  
In the 1980s, the pace of technological change began to challenge older models, 
undermining the neoclassical distinction between public and private sectors (Smith, 1990), as 
well as the assumption that technology is exogenous to the production function (Romer, 1990). 
Exponential increases in technological performance and manufacturing costs accompanying the 
emergence of the microprocessor led to major changes in the competitive behavior of firms in 
tech-based sectors. The challenge of maintaining innovation produced significant increases in 
inter-firm cooperation. Strategic alliances emerged in the 1980s across several sectors. Research 
documenting increases in R&D-based alliances during this period suggest that private firms were 
increasingly collaborating to reduce risk and to share costs (Hagedoorn, 2002). Further, 
alterations in federal anti-trust policy, e.g. the 1984 National Cooperative Research Act, provided 
a more permissive atmosphere for R&D collaboration between private sector firms (Mowery 
1998). 
In 1985 Japanese firms took the majority global market share of semiconductor sales. 
This shocking development was an achievement of the Japanese organizational conglomerate 
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system, known as the keiretsu, which resembled a networked form of organization, designed to 
coordinate increasingly costly R&D activities and facilitate quicker development of strategic 
technologies. Japanese firms also received strong support from major government R&D 
programs (Ham, Linden, and Appleyard,1998; Sakakibara, 1993). This development suggested 
that the Japanese organizational form may have been more resilient and better adapted to 
absorbing the risks associated with the new global environment for technological growth.  
In response, American leaders in the semiconductor industry and Congress crafted an 
innovative policy approach to address the imminent failure of the U.S. based industry. An 
alignment between economic and defense interests facilitated consensus on the policy response. 
The economic interests emphasized preservation of a top U.S. export, supporting high-quality 
jobs, and feeding into numerous other products, i.e. a “platform technology”. The defense 
interests characterized semiconductors and integrated circuits as a critical resource necessary to 
maintain the cutting edge in high-technology weapon systems (Mowery 1983; Mowery and 
Langlois 1996; Mowery 2009).1 Rather than relying on subsidizing firms directly or imposing 
tariffs and trade barriers, industry leaders and policy makers crafted an organizationally-based 
policy solution.  
The result was the non-profit public-private consortium, Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Technology, referred to here as “Sematech”, created in 1987 with support from the Department 
of Defense (DOD) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The 
Sematech consortium can be characterized as a type of strategic partnership or alliance (Siegel 
and Zervos 2002). The consortium began as a multilateral agreement between DOD and fourteen 
U.S. semiconductor manufacturing firms, constituting roughly 85% of U.S. manufacturing 
 
1 The interplay of economic and defense interests can be observed in a 1989 Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Defense Industry and 
Technology hearing on The Future of The Semiconductor Industry -- https://www.c-span.org/video/?10092-1/future-semiconductor-industry 
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capacity. The consortium received roughly $100 million per year for two five-year periods from 
DOD. Sematech members contributed a minimum of one-million dollars, or one percent of sales, 
with a fifteen-million-dollar cap. Sematech represents a case of -self-organization with 
leadership by the members themselves, and a relatively hands-off role of DOD (Beyer and 
Browning 1999). Members were also required to contribute personnel to joint R&D activities at 
the Fab One facility in Austin, TX, where they engaged in a collocated, face-to-face effort to 
conduct “pre-competitive” R&D. The results were shared among the members and applied for 
competitive advantage relative to foreign firms, primarily in Japan. The consortium excluded 
foreign firms from participating from 1987-1995. However, there were no restrictions on 
consortium members forming alliances with foreign firms outside of the Sematech consortium 
(Browning & Shetler 2000). DOD sponsorship and the prohibition on foreign participation ended 
in 1996, but Sematech continued until the present as a non-profit consortium.  
 
Figure 1 – Timeline of Significant Events  
 
Figure Notes – The figure shows the timeline of significant events, which is divided roughly three periods, 
implementation/DOD, maturity/DOD, and post-DOD period. Two economic recessions occurred during the study 
period. The maturity phase occurs after a major shift from a focus on horizontal to vertical relationships in the 
consortium.  
 
Figure 1 shows a timeline of events, which is demarcated into an implementation period, 
a maturity period, and a post-DOD period. This timeline was established based on insights from 
the extant qualitative literature on Sematech (Grindley, Mowery, and Silverman, 1994; Browning 
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and Shetler, 2000; Carayannis and Alexander 2004; Bonvillian 2013). This timeline is important 
to the subsequent analysis.  
 
3. Literature Review  
Government & Network Effectiveness. The literature on network governance provides 
useful concepts for thinking about the processes and outcomes of cross-sector policy 
implementation regarding inter-organizational networks (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Klijn and 
Koopenjan 2015). However, scholars have not sufficiently applied these policy frameworks to 
science and technology (S&T) policy.2 As Laranja (2012) suggested, network governance lacks a 
comprehensive theoretical application to S&T innovation. More generally in public policy and 
administration studies, Berry et al. (2004) suggested there is a lack of attention to network 
evolution, while Provan, Fish, and Sydow (2007) suggested that more attention needs to be paid 
to the dynamics of networks over time and the effect of networks on outcomes. This article 
addresses these issues by applying the network governance framework to analyze an exemplar 
case of S&T policy in terms of both temporal dynamics and organizational performance.  
Klijn and Koopenjan (2015:11) define governance networks as “stable patterns of social 
relations between mutually dependent actors, which cluster around a policy problem, a policy 
programme, and/or a set of resources and which emerge, are sustained, and are changed through 
a series of interactions”. In this study, the imminent collapse of a U.S. industry is the policy 
problem, the policy program is the Sematech consortium, and the spread of cooperative 
partnerships across the industry represents an emerging pattern of social relations, that permits 
 
2 Notable exceptions include Kash & Rycroft (1998) and Wardenaar, de Jong, and Hessels (2014). 
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the combination of heterogeneously distributed resources, broadly defined as tangible or 
intangible from physical capital to information (e.g. Barney 1991). 
From this broad definition of governance networks follows a more specific conceptual 
device, called a network administrative organization (NAO), which helps to further 
recontextualize the case. Provan and Kenis (2008:236) define NAOs as separate administrative 
entities, usually government or non-profit organizations, which serve as governance mechanisms 
that coordinate and sustain the network of interactions between organizations, whether public, 
private, or non-profit. The network governance treatment of Sematech as NAO shifts the 
emphasis away from economic policy instruments, such as direct subsidies and tariffs, to an 
emphasis on the complex interactions between an evolving network of organizations. As Kenis 
and Provan (2009) suggest, NAOs are often adopted when establishing legitimacy and building 
sustainability are particularly important. Human and Provan's (2000) analysis of small and 
medium sized enterprises illustrates the need for establishing legitimacy in private sector 
networks where the norm is competition rather than cooperation. The NAO helps to build the 
kind of legitimacy necessary for aligning organizational objectives with collective goals. The 
extant literature on Sematech reveals the difficulties of aligning interests during the early 
implementation of the consortium, particularly around secrecy and information sharing (e.g. 
Browning, Beyer, & Shetler 1995; Browning & Shetler 2000). Insights from network governance 
help to extend our understanding of Sematech, where the consortium members were also 
competitors in a fierce environment of rapid technological innovation.  
The NAO model contrasts with the lead organization model and participant governed 
model of network governance (Provan and Kenis 2008), which are less applicable to the current 
case. However, Wadrenaar, de Jong, and Hessels (2014) suggest this typology of network 
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governance is a suitable framework for understanding various types of strategic research 
consortia in the S&T setting. Applying these insights to the current case, the lead organization 
model might apply if, for example, the Department of Defense had taken a lead role in the 
semiconductor industry network. Conversely, the participant-governed model has no lead 
organization or distinct administrative entity set up to govern activities and is a decentralized 
model of interaction. Both alternatives to the NAO model lack the network capacity necessary to 
govern interactions between a large number of firms. The lead organization model is too 
centralized and inflexible given the self-organizing nature of technological innovation, while the 
participant governed model is too decentralized and unstable to effectively steer the U.S. high-
tech sector during an existential crisis. The question is, what governance form is appropriate to 
the specific context in order to achieve network effectiveness?  
Provan and Kenis (2008:230) define network effectiveness as the achievement of 
collective outcomes not otherwise possible by individual organizations alone. Yet specification 
of effectiveness varies across different contexts (Kenis and Provan 2009), particularly within 
cross-sector networks where organizations may have distinct goals (Raab, Mannak, and Cambre 
2013; Klijn and Koopenjan 2015). In the case of Sematech, the goals were relatively clear cut: 
increasing process quality, and innovation in semiconductor architecture miniaturization 
(Browning & Shetler 2000; Epicoco 2013). Sematech’s “Black Book” set roadmap milestones 
according to the progressive miniaturization of integrated circuit feature line sizes at the micron 
scale (Browning & Shetler 2000). Given these insights, we define network effectiveness as the 
ability of Sematech members to achieve superior innovation, relative to non-members, according 
to miniaturization of semiconductor line widths.   
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However, there are limitations regarding the conceptualization of government 
intervention in private sector networks. While the networks literature in public administration 
has examined the roles of interaction, collaboration, trust, and reciprocity in multiple settings 
(e.g. Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; O’Toole and Meier, 2004; Ansell and Gash 2008; Emerson, 
Nabatchi, and Balogh, 2012), the focus is often on directive relationships between principals and 
agents (Provan and Milward, 1995), resource-dependencies (Rethemeyer and Hatmaker, 2008), 
and power dynamics (Saz-Carranza, Iborra, Albareda 2016) in the public and non-profit sectors. 
This approach can be limiting in a private sector context, since conceptualizing network 
relationships in terms of power-based dependencies can fail to explain the strategic decision-
making processes of private firms. As we suggest, it may be more useful define the role of 
government as a potential catalyst for cooperation between competitors on scientific and 
technological landscapes (Kash and Rycroft 1998).  
Finally, while the network governance literature provides important descriptive concepts 
(cf. Provan & Lemaire 2012), it does not necessarily motivate specific hypotheses about the 
effect of government on network dynamics or organizational performance in the S&T context. 
The following section integrates this framework with theories necessary for articulating more 
localized hypotheses about how network governance might be used to enhance cooperation and 
innovation in the high-technology sector.  
Strategic Alliances & Network Position.  The literature on strategic alliances illustrates 
the necessity of deploying multiple theories to explain cooperative behavior between 
organizations. Principally, these are transaction cost economics (TCE), the resource-based view 
of the firm (RBV), and social network theories, e.g. social capital theory. The application of 
transaction cost economics provides a robust explanatory framework for strategic alliance 
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behavior in the semiconductor industry (e.g. Oxley, 1997; Yasuda, 2005; Leiblein and Macher, 
2009). With the rapidly rising costs of R&D essential to semiconductor manufacturing, vertically 
integrated but isolated firms in pure competition could no longer maintain progress along the 
semiconductor miniaturization trajectory of Moore’s Law (Epicoco, 2013).3 Strategic alliances 
emerged to facilitate the kind of close cooperation necessary for continual innovation. However, 
cooperation is not frictionless. As Williamson (1981,1985,1991) argued, the transaction costs of 
cooperation emanate primarily from the uncertainty and opportunism associated with human 
nature. These factors are particularly salient when cooperative transactions are uncertain, recur 
frequently over time, and assets are transaction specific, all of which characterize cooperative 
R&D for high-technology. To reduce transaction costs, cooperative alliances in the 
semiconductor industry are often governed by a mix of bilateral and multilateral cross-licensing, 
co-development, and joint venture agreements.  
Applying the logic of transaction costs, Oxley (1997) reasoned that transaction costs 
increase with each additional R&D alliance partner, showing that alliance scope is associated 
with increasingly hierarchical forms of governance from simple licensing agreements to joint 
ventures. Multi-firm alliances are common in the semiconductor industry because innovation 
often requires the application of resources by multiple firms, and greater efficiency may be 
achieved through a single multilateral governance structure rather than through a series of 
bilateral agreements. Multilateral alliances may also propagate effects on the broader network of 
relationships (Persidis and Persidis, 1996; Medcof, 1997; Hwang and Burgers, 1997). In terms of 
network theory, multi-firm alliances could be treated as cliques, where all possible pathways 
between partners are realized (Knoke and Yang 2008); and, each addition to an alliance clique 
 
3 Moore’s Law describes the exponential miniaturization of semiconductor devices, where the number of transistors 
that can be placed on an integrated circuit doubles roughly every two years (Epicoco, 2013:181). 
13 
 
greatly increases the number of connections in the alliance. This suggests a greater capacity for 
sharing and combination of resources in multi-firm alliances (Hage, Jordan, & Mote 2007). Such 
configurations may also facilitate the emergence of network safeguarding mechanisms that serve 
to protect the pattern of exchanges in the network, such as restricting access, imposing sanctions, 
and reputation management (e.g. Jones, Hesterly, Borgatti 1997). We conceptualize the 
Sematech consortium as a type multi-firm alliance, roughly double the size of the largest extant 
alliance and, therefore, permitting resource combination to a higher degree.  
However, large multi-firm alliances come with even greater costs (Li et al., 2012; 
Gudmundsson, Lechner, and Van Kranenburg, 2013). At a certain point the costs of additional 
alliance partners may overwhelm the benefits of resource combination. When the objectives of 
such alliances are public in nature or when governments view them as necessary to fulfill public 
objectives, publicly supported governance regimes such as network administrative organizations 
(NAOs) might provide the supportive structure necessary for managing the costs of cooperation. 
Thus, we integrate TCE with the network governance literature by suggesting that NAOs reduce 
the transaction costs associated with large-scale cooperation.4  
Finally, synthesizing these insights with social network theory, we advance the logic for 
how network governance enhances firm level network position. In social network analysis, 
centrality characterizes the network position of an actor representing prominence, popularity, or 
power within a network, such that actors high in centrality are “well-connected” to other actors 
in the network (Wasserman and Faust 2007; Hanneman and Riddle 2011; Scott, 2017). The most 
basic centrality measure is degree centrality, which simply counts an actor’s ties. We use 
eigenvector centrality, which represents how well-connected an actor is to other well-connected 
 
4 Williamson (1999) makes a very similar argument about the necessity of government to maintain transaction costs 
between nations embodied in the U.S. Department of State. 
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actors. Theory suggests that being connected to other well-connected organizations enhances 
access to complementary resources necessary for innovation at the cutting edge. We suggest that 
NAOs reduce the cooperation costs of strategic alliances leading to increases in cooperative 
activity, which entails an increase in network centrality relative to non-NAO members. Thus, we 
hypothesize that Sematech enhanced the network centrality of member organizations by 
lowering the costs associated with cooperation on pre-competitive research and development.  
 
H1: Network Administrative Organizations enhance the network centrality of member 
organizations relative to other organizations within emerging strategic alliance 
networks. 
 
The resource-based view (RBV) suggests that firms gain an advantage by applying 
resources in a competitive environment (Wernerfelt, 1984). Barney (1991:101) defines resources 
as “all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. 
controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its 
efficiency and effectiveness”. The RBV highlights the importance of difficult or impossible to 
trade (often intangible) resources in explaining performance heterogeneity and persistence (e.g., 
Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). The RBV also calls attention to information and 
knowledge as a resource feeding into organizational performance (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 
2004). In the high-technology sector, information, knowledge, and intellectual property are 
among the most critical resources for competitive advantage. 
Extensions of the RBV through social capital theory suggests that social relationships 
provide access to heterogeneously distributed resources (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; 
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Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Social capital theory focuses attention on 
the ways in which firms seek to leverage their relationships for competitive gain (1997; Lin 
1999). Provan & Lemaire (2012) suggest that organizations gain the advantages of social capital 
when they form network ties. As Walker, Kogut, and Shan (1997) suggest, the “resource view” 
of social capital is concerned with the advantages of relationships for individual firms, rather 
than emphasizing group level processes, such as influence, status, and prestige (e.g. Putnam, 
1995; Podolney, Stuart, Hannan 1996). Similarly, scholars have distinguished between the 
structural, cognitive, and relational dimensions of social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; 
Tsai and Ghoshal 1998; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). For the purposes of this article, we take a 
structural approach, emphasizing a network- and resource-based conceptualization of social 
capital (Lin 1999; Burt 2000). Lin (1999:7) defines social capital as “resources embedded in a 
social structure which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions”. This concept 
suggests why the technological innovation of the firm depends to some extent on its positioning 
within a strategic alliance network.  
Previous research has examined the effects of alliance formation on performance and 
innovation in the semiconductor industry (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Stuart 2000; Hill, 
Jones, and Schilling, 2014; Schilling 2015), as well as the effects of firm positioning within 
alliance networks on performance (Ahuja 2000). Studies have examined the effects of network 
centrality on organizational performance (Zaheer & Bell 2005; Koka & Prescott 2008). Social 
capital extensions of the resource-based view suggest that network centrality measures a firm’s 
access to heterogenous and immobile5 resources in the network (Walker, Kogut, & Shan 1997). 
Leveraging these insights, we advance the following hypothesis.  
 
5 Resource immobility refers to the inability to trade resources between organizations (Peteraf 1993). They are often 
a source of competitive advantage, and firms tend to form alliances in order gain access to these resources. 
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H2: Network centrality enhances the technological performance of organizations in 
strategic alliance networks. 
 
Connecting the logic of H1 and H2 entails that Sematech membership enhances the 
technological performance of member firms through enhancements in network position. This 
logic suggests a mediation model (e.g. Baron & Kenny 1986; Aguinis et al. 2017). Thus, we 
hypothesize that the direct performance effects of Sematech membership flow through its effects 
on the network position of member firms.  
 
H3: Network centrality mediates the effects of Network Administrative Organization 
membership on technological performance relative to other organizations in strategic 
alliance networks. 
  
Since network processes are relational, we suspect that strategic allies of Sematech 
members will experience similar enhancements in network position and technological 
performance relative to firms not directly connected to Sematech members. This is similar to the 
logic of policy diffusion (e.g. Shipan & Volden 2012), but the focus here is on the policy effects 
on technological diffusion through network spillovers. The spillover hypothesis was advanced by 
previous studies (Irwin and Klenow, 1994) but has never been directly applied to this case 
through network analysis. Here, Sematech is thought to have secondary social capital effects, or 
spillovers, on allies of Sematech members. 
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H4: The network and performance effects of Network Administrative Organization 
membership spillover onto strategic allies of NAO members relative to other 
organizations in alliance networks. 
 
Finally, the timeline of events displayed in Figure 1 suggests that the development of 
Sematech within the strategic alliance network moved through three periods during the study 
period: implementation, maturity, and post-DOD. Since technological performance data are not 
available for the implementation period, the maturity period is compared to the post-DOD 
period. Since Sematech continued to exist as a non-profit after DOD exit, quasi-experimentally, 
this amounts to a partial removed treatment effect of DOD exit. DOD exit in 1996 ended the 
subsidy for the consortium and permitted foreign firm membership in Sematech. While the 
removal of the matching subsidy may have reduced Sematech network capacity, the 
simultaneous entry of new powerful foreign firms may have had the opposite effect. Given the 
exploratory nature of the proposition, we advance the following working hypothesis6 that the 
effects of Sematech on network position and technological performance, as well as mediation 
effects, may be stronger during the DOD sponsorship period.  
 
H5: NAO and network effects are stronger during the DOD sponsorship period than in 
the post-DOD period.  
 
 
6 See Shields and Rangarajan (2013) for a discussion of working hypotheses in exploratory research.  
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4. Methods 
Data. To construct the dataset for the study period (1986-2001), alliance data were 
gathered from two sources. First, from 1986-1989 alliance data were gathered from public 
announcements compiled through press releases and other public news announcements. Second, 
alliance data from 1990-2001 were extracted from the ICE/IC Insights Strategic Profiles Reports 
on the global semiconductor industry. The first data source reports only announcements, while 
the second also reports ongoing alliances. The early data between 1986 and 1989 likely 
undercounts alliances. Data on firm sales and technological performance were also gathered 
from these sources. Missing data was gathered from COMPUSTAT/CRSP via WRDS, 
Bloomberg, S&P Capital IQ, and PrivCo. Sematech membership data were acquired from a 
contact with Sematech. Since data on technological performance is only available starting in 
1990, the sample frame for models using technological performance was reduced to 1990-2001.  
The network data were constructed in the following manner. All alliances listed in the 
ICE/IC Insights profiles were aggregated yearly and constructed as symmetrical adjacency 
matrices, a common method for analyzing whole-networks over time (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994). Each year-matrix is one-mode and undirected, with binary values that represent the 
presence or absence of an alliance edge between firm nodes. Isolates were not included. The 
edge weights for each year were set to one to handle cross-listing of alliances in the IC Insights 
profiles. After constructing the yearly adjacency matrices, they were analyzed, and node level 
network statistics were calculated using the network analysis program Gephi. Node level 
measures from each whole-network year were then extracted and merged with firm level panel 
data. Figure 2 shows the development of these networks across the time-period. In these 
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visualizations. A conservative approach is taken in the networks, where ties between Sematech 
members are not included unless they are alliances external to the consortium.  
 
Figure 2 – Yearly Strategic Alliance Network 1986-2001
 
Figure notes –The networks are constructed as one mode, undirected adjacency matrices, where edges are alliances 
and nodes are firms. Red nodes are Sematech members, and red edges are connections with Sematech members. Red 
nodes in 1986 show the future Sematech members. Nodes are sized by degree centrality. Alliances from 1986-1989 
are likely undercounted due to different method of collection. 
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Sample. Sematech members include large and medium sized integrated circuit 
manufacturers. The original members included AMD, AT&T, Digital, Harris, HP, IBM, Intel, 
LSI Logic, Micron, Motorola, NCR Corp, National, Rockwell, and TI. Few changes in 
consortium membership occurred in the implementation phase; it lost members during the 
maturity phase; and the consortium increased in size as foreign firms joined in 1996. Despite 
being prominent firms, the collective performance crisis for U.S. firms (Hof 2011) may temper 
bias from initial selection into Sematech and subsequent performance. A small number of 
Sematech members were not included in the analysis if they also did not appear in the alliance 
data from IC Insights.  
 The larger sample of semiconductor firms included in the broader alliance network were 
also captured through the IC Insights Profiles. These include a heterogenous group of large, 
medium, and small firms, as well as manufacturers, suppliers, and pure-play IP foundries. Since 
firms with no recorded alliances are not included, the analysis is limited only to those firms with 
alliances. As with most non-experimental data, there are missing data in our sample. Thus, the 
number of observations varies across our tables presenting descriptive statistics, correlations, and 
regression models. The different sample sizes are the result of variance in the frequency of 
missing data across variables and across temporal panels. Thus, the final sample used in the 
models has an unbalanced panel structure, which include between 150 to 300 firms depending on 
the model and time period specification.       
Measures. Eigenvector centrality (E.Centrality) was chosen as the variable characterizing 
organizational network position (see Newman 2018:159). In the present study, eigenvector 
centrality represents how well-connected a firm is to other well-connected firms in the network 
(Borgatti, Jones, and Everett 1998; Zaheer, Gözübüyük, and Milanov, 2010). Eigenvector 
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centrality captures network position of a firm better than a basic measure like degree centrality, 
since it includes information not only about a firm’s number of partners but also about the 
prominence of their partners (Newman 2018). Hence, this variable captures information about 
both direct and indirect ties and is among network measures known to impact firm performance 
(Uzzi, 1996; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). Eigenvector centrality was calculated for all firms in each 
network-year cross section then merged with the firm level data.  
The variable for technological performance (Tech-Performance) is the minimum 
integrated circuit feature size that a firm can produce, given yearly data available on 
manufacturing facilities. This is a unique measure specific to the semiconductor industry, where 
the minimum integrated circuit feature size is an objective measure of technological 
sophistication. This variable has been used previously in studies on the semiconductor industry 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Leiblein, Reuer, and Dalsace 2002). Since the measure is 
defined in terms of a continuously decreasing minimum, this variable is reverse coded to be 
consistent with performance. However, the technological performance data have limited 
coverage, compared to the network centrality data. To understand how missing data for this 
variable affect the analysis, we conducted a t-test on the difference on size (annual sales), 
centrality, and headquarters location between firms with and without data on technological 
performance, indicating smaller, less central, US firms tended to have less coverage. The 
technological performance data is derived from data on manufacturing facilities. Many firms 
focus on supplies and intellectual property rather than manufacturing. Thus, the analysis of 
technological performance generally applies to manufacturing firms that are medium to large, 
with relatively higher network centrality, and with a diverse mix of nationalities.  The policy 
variables include Sematech and S.Partners. Sematech is a nominal variable, taking the value of 1 
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if the firm is a Sematech member at time t, and 0 otherwise. S.Partners is also a nominal variable 
taking the value of 1 if a firm has a strategic alliance with a Sematech member at time t, and 0 
otherwise. The control variables include Org.Size and US. We operationalize firm size in terms 
of annual revenue or sales in millions. Measures such as employee count are likely to be 
contaminated by the decision to vertically integrate into production or assembly. More 
specifically, organizational size is operationalized as a three-year moving average of total sales. 
A moving average was used given the cyclical and volatile nature of sales in the semiconductor 
industry. Finally, US captures the nationality of the headquarters of the firm; the variable takes a 
value of 1 for US firms, and 0 otherwise. 
Methods. The primary method of analysis employed is the mixed-effects model, which 
combines elements from fixed and random effects models. The mixed effects model is a 
generalization of the standard linear model, which allows for modeling the means and the 
variance/covariance of the data (Littell et al., 2006). Mixed models were chosen to account for 
correlation within repeat observations on firms without loss of meaning regarding fixed firm 
characteristics (see Allison, 2005), such as firm nationality, Sematech membership which only 
occasionally changes for some firms, and for technological performance which often remains 
identical for multi-year stretches of time. Since the modeling strategy is to compare mediation 
effects and models in two separate four-year periods (Table 2 & 3), there isn’t enough variability 
to produce useful estimates in fixed effects models. However, robustness checks were conducted 
using firm and year fixed effects on the full time period (Table 4). In the mixed effects model, 
the unique firm identifier is the covariance parameter, which is modeled as a random effect for 
repeat observations over time. The variance components of the random parameter (firm id) 
include a covariance estimate and a residual. These two pieces of information are used to 
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calculate the intraclass correlation (ICC), which estimates the amount of variability in the 
outcome accounted for by the firm identifier and the residual (Allison, 2005).  
 
5. Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between all the 
variables used in the subsequent models. The bivariate correlations show significant relationships 
between Sematech members (Sematech), network position (E.Centrality), and technological 
performance (Tech-Performance), and a similar but weaker pattern is observed for allies of 
Sematech members (S.Partners). Additionally, E.Centrality has a significant positive association 
with Tech-Performance. The existence of these intercorrelations conform with expectations and 
suggest the need for multivariate analysis. 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 - Sematech 3200 0.058 0.23 0 1 1      
2 - S.Partners 3200 0.154 0.36 0 1 -0.106 1     
3 - Tech-Performance 966 59.317 29.54 1 104 0.259 0.086 1    
4 - E.Centrality 1962 0.167 0.214 0 1 0.464 0.191 0.468 1   
5 - Org.Size 2581 592.539 1602 0.027 26260 0.465 0.001 0.372 0.534 1  
6 - US 2986 0.687 0.464 0 1 0.076 0.003 -0.155 -0.029 -0.100 1 
7 - Year 3200 1995 4.222 1986 2001 -0.037 0.097 0.538 0.105 0.116 -0.086 
Table notes: The table shows the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of all variables used in the analysis. 
The sample sizes for each variable are different due to the uneven data coverage in the unbalanced panel data.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the comparison of mean values for eigenvector centrality across the study 
period for 1) Sematech members, 2) partners of Sematech members, and 3) non-members/non-
partners. 1986 shows the mean value for future members in 1987 prior to Sematech formation. 
The figure shows that each group begins at similar levels of network centrality. Then, Sematech 
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members and partners of Sematech members experience dramatic increases in centrality across 
the period, with reductions after DOD exits the consortium. It should be reiterated that 1986-
1989 report only contemporary announcements and do not report ongoing alliances, likely 
undercounting alliances in the network during this period. Further, a conservative approach was 
taken for the full analysis in which ties between Sematech consortium members were not 
included in the networks; hence, productive alliance ties between Sematech members are also 
underestimated in these models.  
 
Figure 3 – Sematech & Eigenvector Centrality 
 
 
 
Figure notes - The figure shows the average eigenvector centrality for Sematech members (+), allies of Sematech 
members (o), and non-member/non-allies (x), yearly across a sixteen-year period. Sematech was formed in 1987. 
Thus, 1986 shows the centrality of future members in 1987. 1987-1991 is the implementation phase. 1992-1995 is 
the maturity phase. 1996 is the beginning of the post-DOD phase.  
 
Figure 4 shows the comparison of mean values for technological performance across the 
study period for 1) Sematech members, 2) partners of Sematech members, and 3) non-
members/non-partners. A similar trend to Figure 3 is observed. However, the trend appears much 
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smoother. All firms experience an increase in technological performance across time; Sematech 
members have lower performance in 1990; but Sematech members and their allies experience 
greater gains.  
 
Figure 4 – Sematech and Technological Performance  
 
 
 
Figure notes - The figure shows the average technological performance for Sematech members (+), allies of 
Sematech members (o), and non-member/non-allies (x), yearly across a twelve-year period. 1992-1995 is the 
maturity phase. 1996 is the beginning of the post-DOD phase. 
 
Hypothesis tests are presented in Table 2, which has eight mixed effects models, 
separated by DOD period and post-DOD period. As is illustrated in Figure 1, 1992-1995 
represents the maturity period of Sematech, where the consortium receives DOD support and 
protection; after 1995 represents the post-DOD period, where support is removed, and foreign 
firms are permitted entry. These four-year windows were chosen to avoid impacts of two major 
economic recessions occurring around 1990 and 2000. Technological performance data was 
unavailable during the implementation period, between 1987 to 1990.  
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Model 1 in table 2 shows that Sematech and S.Partners have much larger estimates on 
E.Centrality than non-members, providing support for hypothesis one and hypothesis four.7 
Model 2 shows that Sematech members also have a larger estimate Tech-Performance, but 
S.Partners do not. Model 3 shows that the E.Centrality is significantly associated with Tech-
Performance, providing support for hypothesis two. Model 4 shows that when including 
E.Centrality in the same model with Sematech, the estimate on Sematech is reduced from 19.452 
to 10.039 and the estimate is no longer statistically significant (p, 0.12), providing support for 
mediation in hypothesis three. Following the mediation analysis procedure by Baron & Kenny 
(1986), the results of models 1-4 suggest E.Centrality acts as a mediator through which the 
performance benefits of Sematech flow. The Sobel Test also suggested the indirect effect of 
Sematech (T-stat, 4.17; p,0.00003) on tech-performance via network centrality is significantly 
different from zero (see Preacher & Leonardelli 2001).  
Hypothesis four, regarding the spillover effects on partners of Sematech members, is 
supported in some models but not others. Being an ally of Sematech had a significant estimate on 
E.Centrality but not directly on Tech-Performance. However, the mediation hypothesis may 
apply to allies of Sematech members since the estimate on the mediator is significant, and the 
mediator estimate is significant on performance -- Aguinis, Edwards & Bradley (2017) suggest 
that the direct effect on the outcome variable is actually not necessary to establish mediation. 
Further, the Sobel Test suggested a significant mediation effect (T-Stat,2.95; p, 0.003). 
 
 
 
7 Given potential dependency violations using network data in a linear regression model, we have replicated model 1 
and 5 using the stochastic actor-oriented model in R Siena (Snjiders et al. 2010). This robustness check provided 
support for the hypothesis, where Sematech has positive significant estimate in the DOD period (est. 0.55; SE, 0.16; 
p<0.001) and a smaller but still positive and significant estimate in the post-DOD period (est. 0.41; SE, 0.14; 
p<0.001). Full results are available upon request. 
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Table 2 – Mixed Effects Models: Mediation Analysis, DOD & Post-DOD Periods 
 
 DOD Period (1992-1995) Post-DOD Period (1996-1999) 
  E.Centrality Performance Performance Performance E.Centrality Performance Performance Performance 
Intercept 0.151*** 50.49*** 41.552*** 43.06*** 0.116*** 76.256*** 71.88*** 72.744*** 
 (0.02) (3.881) (3.803) (3.921) (0.023) (3.827) (3.995) (3.984) 
Sematech 0.216*** 19.452**  10.039 0.263*** 16.618**  10.721 
 (0.041) (6.899)  (6.43) (0.043) (5.826)  (5.722) 
S. Partners 0.036** 1.087  -0.099 0.068*** -2.811  -4.118 
 (0.011) (2.117)  (2.061) (0.012) (2.236)  (2.108) 
E.Centrality   48.954*** 46.703***   23.317*** 21.067** 
   (6.624) (6.825)   (6.401) (6.64) 
Org.Size 0.00005*** 0.004** 0.003* 0.002 0.00004*** 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.00001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (6.4E-06) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
US -0.013 -3.346 -2.491 -4.364 0.006 -6.941 -9.217* -9.184* 
 (0.022) (4.455) (3.896) (4.071) (0.026) (4.441) (4.402) (4.381) 
Year Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed 
AIC -767.5 2521.2 2345.1 2333.7 -668.9 2519.2 2331.8 2313.8 
Firm Est. 0.012 403.79 302.09 301.89 0.025 450.15 414.08 410.99 
Residual Est. 0.007 124.63 116.91 116.61 0.008 118.91 104 100.29 
ICC 0.619 0.764 0.721 0.721 0.762 0.791 0.799 0.804 
Num.Orgs 196 196 161 161 231 231 192 192 
N 537 300 283 283 576 281 281 281 
Figure Notes - p<.05*,p<.01**,P<.001***; standard errors in parentheses. The first four models are for a sub-set of the data between 1992-
1995, while the second four models are between 1996-1999, reflecting the timeline in Figure 1. The order of the models represents the steps in 
mediation analysis. The sample sizes in the models are different because of the uneven data coverage across the variables for the unbalanced 
panel data. In addition, the coverage in data changes between the DOD and post-DOD periods.  
 
 
Very similar patterns are observed in the post-DOD period from 1996 to 1999. However, 
there are important differences. Model 5 shows that Sematech’s estimate on E.Centrality is larger 
in the post-DOD period. Yet Model 6 shows a reduced estimate of Sematech on Tech-
Performance. Similarly Model 7 shows that E.Centrality has a lower estimate on Tech-
Performance. Model 8 shows that Sematech retains a larger estimate despite including 
E.Centrality in the model, but with a p-value of only 0.063, indicating only a partial mediation 
effect (e.g. Baron & Kenny 1986). The Sobel Tests for Sematech (T-stat, 2.81; p, 0.005) and 
S.Partners (T-stat,2.77; p,0.006) showed the indirect effects are statistically different from zero. 
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These results provide support for hypothesis five, which specifies that estimates in hypothesis 
one through four are larger during the DOD/Maturity period and smaller in the post-DOD period.  
 To test whether the differences in effect size are significant between the DOD and post-
DOD period, we employ an interaction term approach, where 1992-1995 are coded as 0 in the 
DOD period, and 1996-1999 are coded as 1 the post-DOD period. Table 3 shows the regression 
results. The results show that E.Centrality and Tech-performance are both generally higher in the 
post-DOD period with statistically significant estimates. Further, Sematech maintains a 
significant association with both E.Centrality and Tech-performance in the presence of 
interaction terms. However, in Model 1, the Sematech*post-DOD interaction term is not 
significant, while the S.Partners*post-DOD interaction terms is significant and positive, 
indicating that the allies of Sematech members had increases in network position during the post-
DOD period. In model 2, the Sematech*post-DOD interaction term is significant and negative, 
indicating that Sematech members had higher relative Tech-performance during the DOD 
sponsorship period, consistent with hypothesis 5. Finally, in model 3 the E.Centrality*post-DOD 
interaction term is also negative and significant, indicating that the effect of network position on 
Tech-performance is stronger during the DOD period, which is also consistent with hypothesis 5.  
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Table 3 – Mixed Models: Interaction Term Analysis (DOD/Post-DOD)_ 
 
Interaction Term (DOD/Post-DOD) 
  E.Centrality Performance Performance 
Intercept 0.101*** 49.085*** 44.716*** 
 (0.019) (3.292) (3.276) 
Sematech 0.151*** 17.042***  
 (0.03) (4.223)  
Post-DOD 0.033*** 15.784*** 40.658*** 
 (0.009) (1.751) (5.752) 
Sematech*Post-DOD 0.02 -7.98*  
 (0.026) (3.785)  
S. Partners 0.023 1.57  
 
(0.012) (2.181)  
S.Partners*Post-DOD 0.077*** -5.328  
 (0.016) (2.949)  
E.Centrality 
  14.276*** 
 
  (1.91) 
E.Centrality*Post-DOD 
  -14.251** 
   (5.144) 
Org.Size 0.000*** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
US 0.000 -5.377 -6.28 
  (0.021) (3.943) (3.708) 
AIC -1379.3 5114.5 4766 
Firm Est. 0.017 429.18 340.82 
Residual Est. 0.011 181.07 172.35 
ICC 0.619 0.703 0.664 
Num.Orgs 251 251 213 
N 1113 600 564 
Figure Notes - p<.05*,p<.01**,P<.001***; standard errors in parentheses. 
The models in the table are replications of model 1-3 in table 2 but have 
replaced the year variable for a DOD/post-DOD dummy variable used for 
interaction terms. The sample sizes are different in each model due to 
uneven data coverage for the unbalanced panel data.  
 
 
Table 4 shows the robustness checks for the process model using two-way fixed effects 
models with year and organization fixed effects. The fixed effect model estimates the within 
rather than between organization effect and controls for omitted fixed variables. Due to low 
variability in Sematech membership and the outcome variable on separate four-year periods, 
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these models are used on the full time period. The models in table 4 show a similar patter with 
the notable difference that Sematech remains significant in the final mediation model. This is 
consistent with combining the DOD and post-DOD periods in one analysis, since membership 
rapidly changed in 1996 due to entry of foreign firms in the consortium, only a partial mediation 
effect is suggested by the post-DOD period analysis in table 2. The Sobel Test is not significant 
(T-stat,1.82; p,0.067), failing to provide support for the mediation hypothesis. 
 
Table 4 – Fixed Effects Models: Mediation Analysis, Full Period 
 
 
Full Period (1992-1999) 
  E.Centrality Performance Performance Performance 
Intercept 0.003 48.705*** 46.036*** 46.374*** 
 (0.100) (5.563) (6.952) (6.885) 
Sematech 0.085** 9.906**  9.660** 
 (0.029) (3.523)  (3.449) 
S. Partners 0.052*** -1.524  -1.732 
 (0.009) (1.535)  (1.517) 
E.Centrality 
  12.456* 11.974* 
   (5.106) (5.121) 
Org.Size 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm ID Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed 
Year Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed 
R2 0.835 0.864 0.865 0.868 
N 1114 600 564 564 
Figure Notes - p<.05*,p<.01**,P<.001***; standard errors in parentheses. Firm ID and 
Year are fixed in these models per the two-way fixed effects approach. The sample size 
for each model are different due to uneven data coverage for the unbalanced panel data. 
  
 
6. Discussion  
This study casts light on policy implementation through cross-sector inter-organizational 
networks. The empirical contribution is to reveal a previously invisible domain of cooperative 
activity. The results suggest policy effects on technological performance may be partially 
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mediated through an organization’s network position. By examining the dynamics of strategic 
cooperation in the formal R&D contract network of the semiconductor industry, this study 
suggests that network governance can play a part in the recovery and prosperity of the high-
technology sector.  
This study suggests how publicly sponsored consortia achieve public policy goals by 
facilitating cooperation between private-sector firms. Studies of organizational performance 
often avoid analyzing the relevance of government in explanations of strategic alliance behavior 
and firm performance, relying only firm-based resources (e.g. Barney 1991) and horizontal 
social relations (e.g. Burt 1997). Similarly, studies of science and technology policy tend to 
feature business and economics perspectives. Lambright (2008) suggested the need for analysis 
of S&T from a public policy and administration perspective. Scholars in public administration 
have analyzed the downstream process of contracting for complex technology (Brown, Potoski, 
Van Slyke, 2018). But what are governments to do if U.S. markets for these products fail, or if 
such vendors no longer have access to cutting edge platform technology, especially given the 
prospect that weapon systems or components must then be purchased from foreign nations and 
potential adversaries? In such cases government sponsored research consortia may prove to be a 
useful policy option. 
Further, this study extends the network governance literature (Provan & Kenis 2008) to 
science and technology policy (e.g. Kash & Rycroft 1998; Laranja 2012; Wardenaar, de Jong, 
and Hessels 2014). The results suggest that government sponsored research consortia may be 
structured as network administrative organizations (NAOs) to achieve effectiveness in S&T 
networks. The results also suggest that public sponsorship through matching funds may provide 
needed support for building network capacity, while organizational exclusivity may enhance the 
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network prominence of members. One advantage of studying Sematech as a mode of network 
governance (Provan & Kenis 2008) is that the theoretical tools used to analyze the private sector 
have been brought into public focus. Conversely, rather than conceptualizing the study only 
using public policy focused theories, the combination of policy frameworks with theory from 
business and economics broadens the perspective beyond power asymmetries and dependencies 
between private firms and central public agencies. Thus, the present study provides an integrated 
framework for S&T policy to explain how government action can both remedy market failures 
and catalyze innovation for increasing returns on investment.  
Limitations. First, selection bias remains an issue in studies that do not use randomized 
selection for treatment and control groups. It may be possible that Sematech members self-
selected into Sematech because they were already well performing firms. While there is likely 
some truth to this statement (in relative terms), it is important to bear in mind that Sematech was 
created to save failing U.S. business from foreign competition. Further, studies that estimate the 
effects of Sematech (Irwin and Klenow 1996; Link, Teece, and Finan 1996) show positive 
impacts on performance, but these do not examine the intermediary network effects. Further, the 
expectation is that Sematech is expected to have spillover effects on partners of Sematech 
members and on non-members, which further contaminates distinct group effects. Second, the 
chicken and egg problem between network position and performance persists, since firms that 
perform well will experience greater popularity in a competence-based collaboration network, 
i.e. preferential attachment in social networks (Wagner & Leydesdorff 2005). Third, it is unclear 
how the findings might generalize to other industries. For example, the network administrative 
organization model might not generalize effectively to industries where collaboration accounts 
for only a small or no portion of performance (cf. Provan & Lemaire 2012). Further, it is also 
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unclear whether this approach would be appropriate in areas where strong principal-agent 
assumptions are necessary to maintain accountability (e.g. inherently government functions). 
Finally, the uneven data coverage across variables, the lack of network and performance data on 
years prior to the creation of Sematech and performance data during early implementation limits 
the analysis to mostly associational claims. Hence, while we believe the analysis supports the 
hypothesis, we avoid causal claims regarding the analysis.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Explanations for scientific and technological innovation often underestimate the role of 
government. However, science and technology are often best characterized as public/quasi-
public goods prone to market failures absent government intervention. This study shows that 
governments might address market failures and enhance outcomes in science and technology by 
implementing policy through network governance. S&T policies can enhance technological 
performance for organizations engaged in strategic alliances by strengthening network capacity 
and effectiveness through government sponsored research consortia. Rather than only utilizing 
blunt policy instruments, such as direct subsidies or trade tariffs, the network administrative 
organization approach catalyzes local level cooperation, stimulates self-organization on dynamic 
technological landscapes, and enables synergies for collective advantage.  
The findings may be generalized beyond the semiconductor industry to other sectors of 
interest to policymakers. For example, a comparison of the case of Sematech to emerging 
competition between the U.S. and China on artificial intelligence (AI) is striking. Rather than 
treating the issue as a “trade war” with trade tariffs and direct subsidies, implementation of 
industrial policy on AI could benefit from the network governance approach. Observers have 
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suggested that Sematech is a model of industry-government cooperation (Hof, 2011), which 
might be applied to other areas. However, this study also points to the limitations of network 
governance because specific contextual and historical conditions appear to be critical for success. 
Cooperative policy instruments, such as the public-private consortium model, may be impossible 
to implement in sectors without a history of cooperative activity or in domains where inter-
organizational networks are sparse or non-existent. Further, these types of arrangements may be 
inappropriate in sectors where strong principal-agent relations of hierarchical dependence are 
necessary to ensure accountability for inherently governmental functions. Finally, as Kingdon 
(1984) suggested, collective emergencies are often necessary to produce a cooperative 
atmosphere and a sense of urgency where leaders at odds might find common ground to pass 
legislation through windows of opportunity.  
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